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CONTRACTING OUT OF THE UCC
INTRODUCTION
Sarah Howard Jenkins*
During the mid-forties and fifties, Karl Llewellyn and his coterie
of drafters labored to produce a commercial code that would simplify
and unify commercial law among the States. The effect of these two
goals produces a tension with a historically strong competing public
policy in our jurisprudence of freedom of contracting. The Code
recognizes the expansion of commercial practices by agreement as
an underlying purpose that drives a court's construction of the
Uniform Commercial Code. However, it is the expansion of
commercial practices that is to be fostered by the construction of the
Code. Freedom of contracting is merely the methodology for
expanding those practices. The freedom of contracting parties to
define legal relations within the Code's ambit is restricted. The
question of the degree of restriction on party autonomy and the
ethical limitations on approaches to minimizing the effect of the
Code on contractual relations was posed to UCC scholars and
practitioners at several recent meetings of the Business Law Section
of the American Bar Association. This scholarly discourse led to this
compilation of manuscripts on Contracting Out of the UCC. This
collection of articles and essays addresses the complications,
limitations, and approaches to opting-out of or contracting out of the
legal standards and norms articulated in the substantive Articles of
the Uniform Commercial Code and the implications of such
processes upon the general law of contract.
Focusing on mass marketing transactions, Professor William
Woodward' in his thoughtful submission, Constraining Opt-Outs:
Shielding Local Law and Those It Protects from Adhesive Choice of
* Charles C. Baum Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock,
William H. Bowen School of Law.
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Law Clauses,2 asks the essential question of whether the law "should
permit parties to substitute for the ordinarily applicable law a
different set of rules of their own choosing." His concern is whether
vendors, using adhesion contracts, impose a choice of law term or
choice of forum clause or both and strip the non-drafting purchasers
of protections designed by their legislatures to minimize abusive
business tactics. Professor Woodward initially proposes an ana-
lytical framework to be utilized by the parties and the courts for
determining the enforceability of such terms. He posits that the
forum court must, in the first instance, determine the law applicable
to the transaction by employing its choice of law rules; second,
address the contract law question of the enforceability of the choice
of law term pursuant to the predetermined applicable law insuring
that contract law defenses such as unconscionability and the
reasonable expectation test are applied; and, assuming the term
survives the contract law scrutiny, the forum court must determine
whether the transaction is reasonably related to the designated state
and whether the application of the designated state's laws violate a
fundamental policy of the state whose law would otherwise be
applicable. Despite his convincing rationale, Professor Woodward
rejects this approach and calls for the adoption of a Federal Choice of
Law rule to shield the "rich diversity of State protective law"3 and to
prevent a perversion of our Constitutional system by vendors who
designate one state's law to govern citizens nationwide in mass
marketing transactions.' Until his proposal becomes a reality, he
willingly accepts as the most immediate panacea the adoption of
state shield laws to protect consumers and small businesses that lack
the resources to negotiate or to acquire information on the value of
the imposed choice of law provision.
In the same vein, Charles Knapp,5 an elder statesman of contract
law and theory, in his essay Opting Out or Copping Out: An
Argument for Strict Scrutiny of Individual Contracts6 sounds a
clarion call for reevaluating the mechanical application of Modern
2. William J. Woodward, Constraining Opt-Outs: Shielding Local Law and Those It
Protects from Adhesive Choice of Law Clauses, 40 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 7, 92 (2007).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 83-84, 92.
5. Joseph W. Cotchett Distinguished Professor of Law, UC Hastings College of the Law.
6. 40 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 95 (2007).
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Contract Law, mid-Twentieth Century--"circa 1980," doctrines and
principles such as assent, the duty to read, and the parol evidence
rule to Post Modem, Twentieth-first Century, contracting modes and
processes of individual contracts, drafter-dominated contracts
between commercial enterprises such as employers or mass market
sellers and flesh and blood individuals.7 Given the depersonalization
of the contractual relationship and the ability of the drafter to wield
unrestrained bargaining power, he argues, the issue is not one of
freedom of contract or freedom from contract but the legitimacy of
the drafter's ability to effectively negate the fundamental principles
that inure to individual members of our democratic society without a
bargain, as defined circa 1980. The fundamental principles that he
desires to insure include the right to a jury trial, the availability of a
class action, and the accessibility of a court of law. These rights may
be negated through the union of a choice of law designation, choice
of forum, and the imposition of an agreement to arbitrate. Professor
Knapp concludes his impassioned essay positing as the remedy the
judicial redefinition or reevaluation of the contract doctrine of assent
and unconscionability based on context or the "strict scrutiny" of
standardized individual contracts.
Addressing the same concerns raised by Professors Woodward
and Knapp but using as her subject UCC Article 2A consumer leases,
Professor Irma Russell8 engages in an economic assessment of both
the policies underlying UCC default provisions in general and
specifically those of Article 2A and the enforceability of mass
marketed adhesion contracts.9  Her thesis, that the system of
restrained judicial oversight that insulates true bargains from
governmental control should not be extended to standardized
consumer contracts, is supported by her empirical research of the
prevailing terms offered and enforced by the 10 major national
consumer automobile rental agencies. Each of these agencies, she
found, employs a form lease offering terms and conditions on a
nationwide basis. Russell recognizes that 2A eliminates two of the
7. Charles L. Knapp, Opting Out or Copping Out? An Argument for Strict Scrutiny of
Individual Contracts, 40 LOy. L.A. L. REV. 95 (2007).
8. Professor of Law and Director, National Energy-Environmental Law & Policy Institute
(NELPI), University of Tulsa.
9. Irma S. Russell, Got Wheels?: Article 2A, Standardized Rental Car Terms, Rational
Inaction, and Unilateral Private Ordering, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 137 (2007).
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three potentially offending terms, choice of law and choice of forum,
that both Woodward and Knapp view as coalescing with arbitration
for maximum impact of drafter domination and thus Article 2A
provides greater protection than is available for sales or service
agreements. However, the scrivener's ability to impose an arbi-
tration term and to vary other default provisions support her
conclusion for the need to moderate the prevailing tests for the
enforceability of contract terms.
In his article, Is Arbitration Lawless?,'" Professor Christopher
Drahozal" delves into available empirical data to determine if claims
by leading commentators, including Professor Knapp, that arbitration
is lawless are indeed valid. He begins his assessment with a focused
definition of lawlessness; he then delineates the available data and
contrasts the conduct of arbitrators with that of judges and juries
before reaching his conclusion that arbitrator conduct and their
resolution of disputes are indistinguishable from that of judges and
juries.
Professor Emeritus Fred Miller,'2 immediate past president of
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
questions the wisdom of opting out of the UCC for a transaction
within its scope given the confusion and complexity of the common
law that codification of the UCC was designed to rectify.' 3
Concomitantly, he inquires whether it is wisdom to opt into the UCC
if the statute was not designed for the transaction under consid-
eration. Here, he specifically identifies software licensing. Although
recognizing existing statutory and commentary support for opting
into the various UCC articles, he advises caution in his article,
Writing Your Own Rules: Contracting Out of (and Into) the Uniform
Commercial Code; Intrastate Choice of Law.14  For transactions
within the UCC, Professor Miller offers as an alternative to
agreements varying non-mandatory provisions or agreements desig-
nating another jurisdiction's law, the designation of intrastate law,
10. 40 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 187 (2007).
11. John M. Rounds Professor of Law, University of Kansas School of Law.
12. George Lynn Cross Research Professor Emeritus, and former McAfee Chair in Law and
Centennial Professor, University of Oklahoma College of Law; Of Counsel, Phillips, McFall,
McCaffrey, McVay and Murrah, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.
13. Fred H. Miller, Writing Your Own Rules: Contracting Out Of (And Into) the Uniform




other local codified or substantively relevant non-codified legal
principles or regimes.
Raymond Nimmer 5 and Jean Braucher 6 both weigh in on the
applicability of Article 2 to software licensing in their essays: An
Essay on Article 2's Irrelevance to Licensing Agreements17 and
Contracting Out of Article 2 Using a "License" Label: A Strategy
that Should Not Work for Software Products, respectively.' 8  Dean
Nimmer echoes and expounds on Professor Miller's expressed
irrelevancy of Article 2 to licensing agreements arguing that
information is not a good, that the rationale of Article 2 default rules
is a property-based paradigm, and that the general themes of good
faith, practical construction, and policing for unconscionable terms
are an integral part of general contract law. Hence, these rules and
doctrines as Article 2 themes are irrelevant. Professor Braucher, as
part of the continuing debate, takes exception to the positions
espoused by Nimmer and Miller and offers a functional approach to
resolving the issue of the applicability of the Article 2 to software
licensing.
Professors James E. Byrne 9 and Sarah Howard Jenkins" and
practitioners Meredith S. Jackson and Paul S. Turner2 focus on the
theory and mechanics of contracting out of specific substantive
articles. Meredith S. Jackson's22 essay, Contracting Out of Article
9,23 presents a pithy assessment of the likely motives driving the
desire to contract out of Revised Article 9, the planning paradigms
available-including "morphing" the collateral, and the attendant
15. Dean, Leonard H. Childs Professor of Law, and Co-Director of the Intellectual Property
and Information Law Program University of Houston Law Center.
16. Roger C. Henderson Professor of Law, James E. Rogers College of Law, University of
Arizona.
17. 40 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 235 (2007).
18. 40 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 261 (2007).
19. Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law; Director of the Institute of
International Banking Law & Practice, Inc.
20. Charles C. Baum Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock,
William H. Bowen School of Law.
21. Former Attorney at Law; author of numerous articles and books, including Law of
Payment Systems and EFT and Negotiating Wire Transfer Agreements: A Guide for Treasury
Executives, Bankers & Attorneys; and former Assistant General Counsel Occidental Petroleum
Corporation, San Diego, California.
22. Ms. Jackson heads the debt finance practice of Irell & Manella LLP's debt finance and
has been named California Super Lawyer from 2003 to the present.
23. 40 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 281 (2007) (emphasis added).
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risks in completely contracting out of Revised Article 9 or merely
varying its effect. She tersely concludes, however, that "[w]ithin the
parameters of careful structuring and disclosure ... parties should
find Article 9 a flexible and responsive system of rules that facilitates
commercial creativity. 24  Impliedly she stresses, as other con-
tributors, the need to be knowledgeable of not only the principles,
policies, and goals of the applicable law but also those of the target
regime. Byrne, Jenkins, and Turner separately provide compre-
hensive evaluations of the ability to contract out of or vary the terms
of Article 5,25 Article 2,26 and Articles 3, 4, and 4A,27 respectively.
Stephanie Heller, Counsel and Vice President of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, echoes the general concern of relevancy
and persuasively challenges the notion of the continued viability of
Article 4 payments law as bank collection process shifts from paper
check processing to electronic processing in her essay entitled: An
Endangered Species: The Increasing Irrelevancy of Article 4 of the
UCC in an Electronics-Based Payments System.28 Heller provides a
concise review of automatic clearing house check conversion
products and the growing use of inter-bank electronic check
exchange agreements for the collection of electronic check images,
two separate and competing paradigms that are swiftly putting an end
to the need for paper based rules. She concludes that agreements or
consent to the use of a check as the source of collection information
for check conversion products, opting out of Article 4, are motivated
by a desire for faster payment and not necessarily a rejection of
Article 4 rules. "Variation of the UCC rules is not the driver of the
contracting out practice but rather an unexpected casualty of it. '29 In
her discussion of agreements for the collection of electronic images,
Heller identifies the most troublesome issues raised by the process
and the void in existing payments laws, including Article 4 and
24. Id. at 296 (2007).
25. James E. Byrne, Contracting Out of Revised UCC Article 5 (Letters of Credit), 40 Loy.
L.A. L. REV. 297 (2007).
26. Sarah Howard Jenkins, Contracting Out of UCC Article 2, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 401
(2007).
27. Paul S. Turner, Contracting Out of the UCC-Variation by Agreement under Articles 3,
4, 4A, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 443 (2007).
28. 40 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 513 (2007).
29. Stephanie Heller, An Endangered Species: The Increasing Irrelevance of Article 4 of the




Finally, Professor Christina L. Kunz30 addresses the rarely
considered ethical implications of efforts employed by lawyers to
contract out of applicable legal regimes, triggering among other
ethical duties those of competency and zealous representation within
the bounds of the law.3 These ethical questions, she suggests,
"apply to all contractual drafting" including discerning mandatory
provisions, drafting on the edge of validity, proposing invalid
contractual clauses, and making representations to clients, opposing
counsel, or opposing parties.
We believe this symposium of articles and essays is only part of
the dialogue on both the private ordering of contractual relations and
the relevancy of the UCC as global commerce and electronic
payments are increasing exponentially. We invite each reader not
only to engage the substance of our individual contributions but also
to participate in the discourse by way of critique or response.
30. Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law.
31. Christina L. Kunz, The Ethics of "'Iffi' and Invalid Contract Clauses, 40 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 487 (2007).
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